

**ATTORNEY’S FEES AND ILLINOIS DIVORCE:  
FOLLOWING THE TORTUOUS PATH:**

**LEVELING AND RE-LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD -  
20 YEARS LATER – DIVORCE AND POST-DIVORCE ONLY**

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**Executive Summary:** Since June 1, 1997 detailed legislation has been in force controlling attorney's fees in divorce and matrimonial law matters (cases under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act—"IMDMA"). While there was the promise to quickly amend this legislation to address some of the significant concerns, until 2009 there were no significant amendments. Effective January 1, 2016, we have a new amendments to the fee legislation. And with the 2016 amendments we continue providing some tweaks to the law regarding attorney's fees in divorce and parentage cases. Note that separately I have an outline that addressing issues unique to parentage in Illinois family law cases.

**2016 Changes Highlighted:** The purpose of the attached outline is to give a comprehensive sense of the key areas of dispute regarding the legislation and discuss the case law addressing this legislation, the [2009 amendments](#), and the 2016 amendments. At the outset, I highlight the changes to the purposes of the IMDMA per the 2016 amendments which provide in part:

(8) Make reasonable provision for support ~~spouses and minor children~~ during and after an underlying dissolution of marriage, legal separation, parentage, or parental responsibility allocation action litigation, including provision for timely advances ~~awards~~ of interim fees and costs to all attorneys, experts, and opinion witnesses including guardians ad litem and children's representatives, to achieve substantial parity in parties' access to funds ~~for pre-judgment litigation costs in an action for dissolution of marriage or legal separation;~~

The other substantive changes to the attorney's fees legislation in the 2016 legislation include:

SEC. 501(C-1)

As used in this subsection (c-1), "interim attorney's fees and costs" ....

(2) .... Any portion of any interim award constituting an overpayment shall be remitted back to the appropriate party or parties, or, alternatively, to successor counsel, as the court determines and directs, after notice **in a form designated by the Supreme Court. An**

order for the award of interim attorney's fees shall be a standardized form order and labeled "Interim Fee Award Order".

That form has now been published.

The next key change is that for some reason the legislation reduced the time for filing a contribution petition to 14 days after the close of proofs in a final hearing.

**SEC. 503. DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY AND DEBTS.**

(j) After proofs have closed in the final hearing on all other issues between the parties (or in conjunction with the final hearing, if all parties so stipulate) and before judgment is entered, a party's petition for contribution to fees and costs incurred in the proceeding shall be heard and decided, in accordance with the following provisions:

(1) A petition for contribution, if not filed before the final hearing on other issues between the parties, shall be filed no later than 14 ~~30~~ days after the closing of proofs in the final hearing or within such other period as the court orders.

Next two subsections were added as to types of fees under Section 508(a):

**SEC. 508. ATTORNEY'S FEES; CLIENT'S RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES RESPECTING FEES AND COSTS.**

(a) Awards may be made in connection with the following: ....

(4) The maintenance or defense of a petition brought under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking relief from a final order or judgment under this Act. Fees incurred with respect to motions under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be granted only to the Party who substantially prevails.

(7) Costs and attorney's fees incurred in an action under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

And finally there is a new tag along specifically addressing attorney's fees in post-decree proceedings and the nature of the fee hearing:

A petition for temporary attorney's fees in a post-judgment case may be heard on a non-evidentiary, summary basis.

## **Interim Fees and Divorce Proceedings**

### ***Nash* -- Disgorgement of Interim Fees Requires Clear Finding of Inability on Behalf of Both Parties.**

[\*IRMO Nash\*](#), 2012 IL App (1st) 113724

*Nash* ruled that where the order was ambiguous as to the inability of both parties to pay interim attorney's fees as required under section 501(c-1)(3) of the IMDMA, the trial court lacked authority to require disgorgement. Accordingly, the disgorgement order was void and must be vacated.

### ***Earlywine* - Interim Attorney's Fees and Disgorgement: Illinois Supreme Court Rules Advance Payment Retainer No Bar to Disgorgement.**

[\*IRMO Earlywine\*](#), 2013 IL 114779

There are not many disgorgement cases. The issues addressed by the Illinois Supreme Court involved Separation of Powers, the Supreme Court Rules and the *Dowling* case. The question was essentially whether the Supreme Court Rules and *Dowling* trumped the disgorgement provisions when there is an "advance payment" retainer. The point is that with an advance payment fees earned are not "available funds" under the statute. The Supreme Court somewhat sidestepped this point. Also, construing the statute to make earned fees available for disgorgement, will discourage attorneys from getting involved in low-income, low-asset cases.

The Supreme Court held:

It is clear from the attorney-client agreement that the advance payment retainer in this case was set up specifically to circumvent the "leveling of the playing field" rules set forth in the Act. To allow attorney fees to be shielded in this manner would directly undermine the policies set forth above and would strip the statute of its power. If we were to accept James' argument, an economically advantaged spouse could obtain an unfair advantage in any dissolution case simply by stockpiling funds in an advance payment retainer held by his or her attorney.

The court also stated:

To the extent that James argues that the funds in his advance payment retainer were obtained from John's parents and are not marital property, we note that the statute does not distinguish between marital property and nonmarital property for the purpose of disgorgement of attorney fees. The statute contemplates that retainers paid "on behalf of" a spouse may be disgorged.

A more critical distinction, which still has not been clearly decided, was whether fees already earned, not still in unearned (or *Dowling*) retainers, would be subject to disgorgement. Under the current statute, that distinction is not evident, and could be read to include fees paid and earned in the playing field leveling and disgorgement.

And it had seemed that this one was not properly presented to be able to get at the issue that the attorney appealing sought. This was because he did not appear to perfect for the purpose of appeal the advance payment retainer issue. The real issues that were not addressed at the appellate court level are points that under Separation of Powers, the Supreme Court Rules and the *Dowling* case trump the legislation. But fees earned are not "available funds" under the statute. The Appellate Court never understood this point. The larger point is that construing the statute to make earned fees those available for disgorgement discourages attorneys from becoming involved in low-income, low-asset cases.

**Interim Fees and Post-Dissolution of Marriage Proceedings and First District's *Beyer***

**Opinion:** An issue that was clarified by a First District appellate court decision is whether IMDMA § 501(c-1) and § 503(j) apply to post-dissolution of marriage proceedings. Trial courts had been divided on this issue. *IRMO Beyer*, 324 Ill.App.3d 305 (1st Dist., 2001), clarified this issue. But *Beyer* did not address the issue of whether a hearing in post-decree proceedings should be an expedited basis. In my writings before the 2009 amendments I had urged that there could not be a presumption regarding hearings on an expedited basis in paternity cases.

Thus, before the passage of the 2009 Amendments while there was an argument that the interim fee statute should apply to post-decree proceedings the better-reasoned approach was that the interim fee statute does not apply in post-dissolution of marriage proceedings. Nevertheless, we now have one appellate court decision, *IRMO Beyer*, which takes the opposite approach. Additionally, the language of the 2009 Amendments now make it clear that the legislation applies to post-divorce proceedings.

As set forth below, we already have at least two divisions among the districts as to issues relating to the "Leveling" amendments: 1) whether in contribution awards reasonableness is a necessary element; and 2) whether in post-judgment proceedings the contribution petition must be heard before judgment is entered.

**Interim Fees and Expert's Fees:** *IRMO Alexander*, 368 Ill. App. 3d 192 (Fifth Dist., 2006), addressed whether expert fees are authorized under the interim fee legislation. The appellate court stated that using a liberal reading of the statute, an interim fee award may include an interim award of expert's fees.

**Evidentiary Hearing Required in Pre-Decree Dissolution Case Where Significant Problems with Affidavit:** *IRMO Radzik*, 2011 IL App (2d) 100374, involved the issue of whether the affidavits supporting an interim fee petition were either outdated or inaccurate. The case ultimately held that given the problems with the affidavit, good cause was shown for an evidentiary hearing. The appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion in its November 2009 interim fee order requiring the husband's IRA to be liquidated. The appellate court pointed out that the second petition for interim fees contained no affidavit from the petitioner or her attorneys:

In addition, the local rules required that the petition contain a current financial affidavit and that other updated financial documents be produced at the hearing. 19th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 11.02. \*\*\* However, even if the court considered both petitions and their exhibits together, the evidence to support petitioner's inability to pay and respondent's ability to pay was lacking. The petition alleged only generally that petitioner could not pay and that respondent had a substantial income and was "well able" to pay. As to petitioner's inability to pay, the financial affidavit was clearly outdated and inaccurate. \*\*\* In addition, and unlike the respondent in *Rosenbaum-Golden*, respondent here provided not just allegations, but evidence, in the form of eBay printouts, reflecting that petitioner's financial affidavit was likely an inaccurate picture of her current financial status. \*\*\* **At a minimum, we think that good cause was shown to hold an evidentiary hearing.** However, the court abused its discretion in determining that petitioner established respondent's ability to pay, because it received virtually no evidence regarding respondent's present ability to pay the amount that the court awarded.

An excellent discussion from the appellate court stated:

In sum, we conclude that a court's knowledge of the case can stretch only so far. The Act permits nonevidentiary, summary hearings on interim fee petitions, but it does not obviate the need for proof. The Act requires the petitioning party, through the petition, affidavits, and any other relevant documents, to establish both his or her inability to pay and the responding party's ability to pay. While the court here might have been able to determine from its knowledge of the case that an interim fee award might be appropriate or that the fees that counsel charged (and, in turn, that petitioner requested) were theoretically reasonable, the record does not reflect that petitioner in any way established respondent's ability to pay the amount that the court, in fact, awarded. Thus, we reverse the November 6, 2009, interim fee award.

**Substantial Interim Fee Affirmed Despite the Fact that the Party Receiving Substantial Fee Award Had Already Been Paid More than Other Party / No Right to Pre-Decree Evidentiary Hearing:** [\*IRMO Levinson\*](#), 2013 IL App (1st) 121696, affirmed a substantial interim fee award. The syllabus of this case provided an accurate summary: "In an unusually litigious marriage dissolution action, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering respondent to pay \$78,500 in interim fees (including expert fees) for petitioner based on consideration of the statutory factors and the financial information indicating that respondent controlled the marital assets and had the means to pay the fees." One issue is whether there should have been an evidentiary hearing as in *Radzik*. The appellate court distinguished the case:

In the present case, the interim fees awarded were not ordered to be paid from a liquidated IRA or any other retirement account. In addition, the *Radzik* court's concern in reversing and ordering an evidentiary hearing was that the petitioner had not included supporting documentation that the respondent could pay the requested interim fee award,

and the court had reason to believe the minimal documentation provided was “inaccurate.” These concerns are not present in the case at bar. Rather, Robin supported her motion for interim fees with substantial documentation . Robert’s reliance on *Radzik* is unpersuasive.

**Case Law Re Contribution Petitions:** The common theme of case law addressing the Leveling Amendments is that the changes make it more difficult for lawyers and appellate courts to understand the complexities of the statute. That remains with the 2016 amendments. Recent case law also points out the less than revolutionary aspects of the Leveling amendments consistent with the 2017 *In re Marriage of Heroy II* decision.

***McGuire* — Changes Are Procedural and Not Substantive vs. *Haken* – Inability / Ability is Not the Standard:** Specifically, in *IRMO McGuire*, 305 Ill.App.3d 474 (5th Dist. 1999), GDR 99-60, the appellate court held the Leveling amendments make only procedural changes, while keeping intact the substantive criteria for awards. In light of the 2009 second set of amendments, however, and the more recent case law, this is oversimplified. The 2009 amendments provide for differing standards regarding pre and post-judgment proceedings. Now, if one were urging that the amendments are largely procedural (as this case urges) you would point to the historical case law not sticking with the “inability / ability” standard but instead focusing on the relative abilities. In any event, *McGuire* held a contribution award was not mandatory even though the party seeking the fee award received a disproportionate property division.

In contrast to the *McGuire* decision stands the *IRMO Haken*, 394 Ill. App. 3d 155 (Fourth Dist., 2009) case. *Haken* contains a succinct discussion of the historical ability/inability standards – which are even more important to note in light of the 2009 amendments when read in connection with the case law following the 2009 amendments. *Haken* addresses the standards that apply both before the 1997 amendments and after the 2009 amendments as applied to post-judgment proceedings, states:

Rudolf argues the award of fees under section 508(a) was improper because the petitioning party must prove an inability to pay fees and the ability of the other party to pay. Here, the court found each party had the ability to pay his or her own fees. Rudolf contends "inability to pay" is a prerequisite to a fee award under section 508(a). **Such a reading of this section eviscerates the statutory directive in section 503(j)(2) to consider the criteria for the division of marital property under section 503(d) in making contribution awards.** Under Rudolf's reading of section 508(a), once a court finds a party has the ability to pay his or her own fees, further inquiry ends and the court need not look at any other factor to determine whether contribution should be made. Rudolf is wrong. \*\*\*

The statute directs the court to consider many factors when deciding the amount of contribution a party may be ordered to make. **The requirement that a person seeking contribution show an inability to pay appears nowhere in the statute.** The relative financial standing of the parties should be considered, and that is what the section 503(d) factors are all about.

**Dowd: Court Applies Ability and Inability Standard without Commenting on Statute and Other Case Law:** But even recently, Illinois case law still contains “sloppy language” not consistent with the statutory standards or case law such as *Haken*. [IRMO Dowd](#), 2013 IL App (3d) addressed the wife’s petition for contribution and the appellate court gave scant consideration to the case law and stated rather simply:

Sharon also contends on appeal the trial court erred by denying her petition for contribution to attorney fees. \*\*\* *In re Marriage of Morse*, 240 Ill. App. 3d 296, 312 (1993). The propriety of an award of attorney fees is dependent upon a showing by the party seeking them of an inability to pay and a demonstration of the ability of the other spouse to do so. *Id.* In this case, the trial court found that “both parties have sufficient assets to pay their own attorney’s fees.” We agree. Sharon received property and accounts valued in excess of \$200,000, excluding the value of the marital home and her maintenance award. Based on this record, we conclude Sharon had sufficient income and assets to pay her own attorney fees.

**Shen – Appellate Court Case Focused on Ability / Inability Language:** In [IRMO Shen](#), 2015 IL App (1st) 130733 (June 30, 2015), also contained misleading language regarding the standard to be used in contribution petitions:

The court did not use the wrong legal standard in deciding to deny the wife’s request for contribution to attorneys fees, as the Illinois Supreme Court continues to espouse the rule from *In re Marriage of Schneider*, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 174 (2005), that the spouse petitioning for contribution to attorney fees must show an inability to pay and the ability of the other spouse to pay, and this was the standard followed by the court. The evidence supported the husband also did not have the ability to pay fees and so the court’s denial of the wife’s request for contribution was not an abuse of discretion. We affirm the portion of the dissolution judgment denying the wife contribution to her attorney fees.

As stated above there is a significant body of case law critical of the so called inability / ability standard. An example of the June 2015 *Shen* case being on the wrong side of the law is the quote from a more recent case: [IRMO Hill](#), 2015 IL App (2d) 140345 (September 28, 2015):

Moreover, our court has recently noted that *Schinelli* relied on older case law in looking solely to the parties’ incomes and assets in determining “inability to pay,” while the current version of section 508(a) requires a court to consider all of the various statutory factors contained in sections 503(j) and 504 of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/503(j), 504 (West 2012)), relating to the distribution of marital property and the award of maintenance. See *Sobieski*, 2013 IL App (2d) 111146, ¶ 49 (noting this reliance on older case law and that the phrase “inability to pay” does not appear in the current version of section 508(a)).

**Anderson – Ability / Inability Is Not the Standard, The Standard is Relative Abilities to Pay:** *IRMO Anderson*, 2015 Ill. App. 3rd.140257. The *Anderson* opinion, by Justice Mary K. O’Brien, citing an earlier version of this paper stated:

We find the analysis offered by *Haken* court persuasive and adopt its rationale. *Haken* incorporates the statutory amendments designed to “level the playing field” in dissolution proceedings. See Gunnar J. Gitlin, *The Revolution That Wasn’t: Leveling and Re-leveling the Playing Field-Twelve Years Later*, Gitlin Law Firm (2009), available at ...; Gunnar J. Gitlin, *Following the Tortuous Path: Leveling and Re-Leveling the Playing Field-Seventeen Years Later*, Gitlin Law Firm (2014), available at ... Accordingly, we reject the necessity of proving a spouse’s inability to pay as a prerequisite to a contribution award. In determining a fee petition, a trial court should consider the parties’ relative financial circumstances as directed by the statutory factors in sections 503(d) and 504(a). We believe this approach is aligned with the statutory goals and better allows attorneys the opportunity to recoup at least a portion of their fees...

**Cases Citing Traditional Ability / Inability – *Adams* and *Heroy*:** A 2004 Illinois appellate court decision addressing the issue of a fee contribution hearing took the traditional view that fees should not be granted where one party has the ability to pay. In *Adams*, 348 Ill. App. 3d 340 (3<sup>rd</sup> Dist, 2004), the appellate court reversed a fee award despite affirming the trial court's increase in support. The appellate court stated:

The primary obligation for payment of attorney fees rests upon the party for whom the services are rendered. In *re Marriage of Mantei*, 222 Ill. App. 3d 933 (1991). However, the court may order one spouse to pay some or all of the attorney fees incurred by the other. 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2000). In order to justify an award of attorney fees, the party seeking the award must demonstrate both financial inability to pay the fees and the ability of the other spouse to do so. In *re Marriage of Cotton*, 103 Ill. 2d 346 (1984).

In this case, Carol's financial disclosure statement indicates that she had a savings account with a balance of \$74,000, as well as other financial assets. We conclude that the trial court erred in awarding Carol attorney fees because the record shows that she had the ability to pay her own attorney fees upon seeking the default judgment.

A later case to also cite the traditional tests regarding awards of attorney’s fees is the *IRMO Heroy* decision where the appellate court commented:

Generally, it is the responsibility of the party who incurred attorney fees to pay for those fees. In *re Marriage of Nesbitt*, 377 Ill. App. 3d 649, 656 (2007). Section 508 of the Act, however, provides for attorney fee awards in circumstances where one party lacks financial resources and the other has the ability to pay. 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2006); *Schneider*, 214 Ill. 2d at 174. It is the party seeking contribution toward her attorney fees who bears the burden of showing her insufficient financial resources and her spouse’s ability to pay. *Schneider*, 214 Ill. 2d at 174.

In this case, both parties filed petitions for contribution to attorney fees in the trial court. The trial court found that David and Donna had incurred over \$2.2 million in attorney fees. After reviewing the pertinent factors outlined in the Act pertaining to attorney fee



contribution, the trial court ordered that “each party is responsible for his/her own fees.” David, however, contends that “[w]hen the [trial] court allocated 55% of certain marital debt to David, \*\*\* it apparently forgot that this same debt was incurred by the parties during the divorce proceedings to pay attorneys fees.” We agree. \*\*\* Although the parties borrowed funds to pay for other costs in addition to attorney fees, there is no dispute that some of the debt incurred by the parties during their dissolution proceeding includes money borrowed to pay for their respective attorney fees and costs. By failing to account for the portion of the debt associated with attorney fees and costs prior to allocating a disproportionate share of the debt to David, the court inadvertently required David to contribute to Donna’s attorney fees, in contravention of its express order that the parties be responsible for their own fees. Donna does not contend nor does the record establish that she is unable to pay for her attorney fees. See *Schneider*, 214 Ill. 2d at 174-75 (recognizing that an attorney fee award is improper absent evidence of inability to pay). Accordingly, David is entitled to a credit toward the portion of the marital debt encompassed by Donna’s attorney fees. Because the record is unclear as to portion of the marital debt that is related to the parties’ attorney fees and costs, we remand this matter to the trial court with directions to determine the portion of the debt encompassed by Donna’s attorney fees and to credit David accordingly.

**Price Rejecting Ability / Inability Standard for Contribution Awards:** [IRMO Price](#), 2013 IL App (4th) 120155, addressed the standard the court should apply when considering a contribution awards. The appellate court stated:

Melvin asserts the court erred in ordering him to pay a portion of Jill's attorney fees because the financial circumstances of the parties is substantially similar due to the court's division of marital assets, liabilities, and Jill's maintenance award, and because Jill failed to show an inability to pay her own attorney fees. Jill argues the post-dissolution financial circumstances of the parties are not substantially similar because Melvin was awarded all of the parties' businesses, which produced gross annual incomes in excess of \$1.7 million. We agree with Jill.

The appellate court *rejected* the assumption that fees under the current statute are based on the historical ability/inability standard. The appellate court stated that the standards in this case were “criteria for division of marital property under this Section 503 and, if maintenance has been awarded, on the criteria for an award of maintenance under Section 504.” 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2).” I had assumed that this meant that if maintenance was awarded the fees were based on the standards of Section 504 (without assuming that in cases with maintenance awards fees were based on the standards of both Sections 503 and 504).

One recent case suggests the factors should include both the factors in 503 and 504. So, while *Price* does not clarify this potential distinction, *Sobieski*, discussed next, does address this. Once again, *Sobieski* rejected the use of the traditional standard but in language that emphasized relative financial abilities as the standard based on previous case law rather than the ability/inability standard.

[IRMO Sobieski](#), 2013 IL App (2d) 111146, noted case law addressing the financial ability and

inability standards regarding fee petitions against the opposing party.

The *Schinelli* court cited general guiding principles: “[t]he propriety of an award of attorney fees is dependent upon a showing by the party seeking them of an inability to pay and the ability of the other spouse to do so,” and an award of attorney fees will be reversed “when the financial circumstances of both parties are substantially similar and the party seeking fees has not shown an inability to pay.” *Schinelli*, 406 Ill. App. 3d at 995. These rules are not incorrect; they are, however, incomplete when applied to the facts of this case. **The language cited in the analysis of the contribution award in *Schinelli*, as well as other recent marriage dissolution cases, was repeated from cases that predate the current, amended version of Section 508(a).** See *IRMO Haken*, 394 Ill. App. 3d 155, 162 (2009) (providing examples from the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Districts of our Appellate Court); see also *IRMO Roth*, 99 Ill. App. 3d 679, 686 (1981) (preamendment case cited by *Schinelli* for rule that court abuses its discretion in awarding attorney fees when parties are in substantially similar financial situations). Although neither the phrase “inability to pay” nor a specific test for substantially similar financial situations appears in the statute, the factors under Sections 503(d) and 504(a) are there to compare *the relative financial standings of the parties*. *Haken*, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 162. The statutory factors are the means by which a trial court can determine whether a spouse has an inability to pay or whether the parties’ financial situations are so similar that a contribution to attorney fees would be improper. Furthermore, the conclusory phrase “inability to pay” was not meant to be interpreted definitively, whereas the plain language of the statutory factors provides a framework within which to compare the relative means of parties to pay their attorney fees. See *IRMO Schneider*, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 174 (2005) (“Financial inability exists where requiring payment of fees would strip that party of her means of support or undermine financial stability.”); *IRMO Pond*, 379 Ill. App. 3d 982, 987 (2008) (“Inability to pay does not require a showing of destitution \*\*\*. \*\*\* [T]he court should consider the allocation of assets and liabilities, maintenance, and the relative earning abilities of the parties.”); *IRMO Carr*, 221 Ill. App. 3d 609, 612 (1991) (“ ‘[I]nability to pay’ must be determined relative to the party’s standard of living, employment abilities, allocated capital assets, existing indebtedness, and income available from investments and maintenance.”). [Emphasis added.]

Accordingly, the *Sobieski* appellate court rejected the husband’s argument that it should apply a comparison of their net incomes in a simple formulaic method in determining whether to award attorney’s fees.

Recently, in *In re Marriage of Heroy [Heroy II]*,<sup>1</sup> the Illinois Supreme Court tried to split the difference between these two approaches while siding somewhat in favor of the cases focusing upon the statutory requirements as against primary focus on the inability/ability analysis. The *Heroy* decision has been heavily litigated over the years. *Heroy I* is discussed in the maintenance chapter<sup>2</sup> as it involved the appellate court

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<sup>1</sup> *In re Marriage of Heroy*, 2017 IL 120205.

<sup>2</sup> See Gitlin on Divorce: A Guide to Illinois Family Law: § 15-18[d][3] “Marriages of More than Twenty Years” and § 15-

affirming an indefinite maintenance award of \$35,000 per month where the wife had a law degree and an earning potential of more than \$100,000 annually. Less than a year after the Illinois Supreme Court appellate declined former husband's petition for leave to appeal, the former husband, Heroy, filed petition to terminate or modify the maintenance award. His former wife, Tuke, filed a petition for contribution to her attorney fees. In 2012, the trial court issued its memorandum opinion and order concluding that Heroy had proved his income had decreased but only decreasing maintenance from \$35,000 to \$27,000 per month. The trial court also granted the contribution petition, awarding Tuke \$125,000 of her \$345,000 of fees—36% for those keeping statistics.

During oral arguments, the trial court acknowledged a tension between the Court's statement in *In re Marriage of Schneider*,<sup>3</sup> and the provisions of section 508 of the IMDMA regarding the standard for awarding attorney fees. The trial court acknowledged the statement in *Schneider* where it ruled noted that an award of contribution is appropriate when the petitioning party is unable to pay his or her attorney fees and the other party has an ability to do so.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, the trial court noted that section 508 instructs the court to apply a list of factors to determine whether one party should be required to contribute to the attorney fees of the other, including the criteria used to divide marital property and award maintenance. The trial court noted that it would apply the standard in *Schneider* and concluded in its written opinion that Tuke had some ability to pay fees but if she were required to pay all her fees her financial stability would be undermined. The trial court found Heroy's ability to pay. Heroy appealed and Tuke filed a petition seeking \$100,000 in prospective fees to defend the appeal and the trial court granted the petition but limited the payment to \$35,000. Heroy again appealed and the appellate court reversed in an unpublished decision based upon that the trial court had stated it intended to award 25% of the former husband's net cash flow which was \$25,745 per month. Finally, the appellate court reversed the trial court's attorney-fee award concluding that there was no evidence supporting Tuke's claim that she was unable to pay her attorney fees. The Court allowed Tuke's petition for leave to appeal and the request of Heroy for cross-relief regarding maintenance modification. The Illinois Supreme court overruled the appellate decision and found that the trial court properly found that should the former wife have to pay all of her attorney fees it would undermine her financial stability.

The Court reasoned:

The language in section 508 is clear and unambiguous. The trial court must (1) "consider[ ] the financial resources of the parties" and (2) make its decision on a petition for contribution "in accordance with subsection (j) of Section 503."<sup>5</sup> To say that the court should not consider the statutory factors is clearly contrary to the plain language of the statute. Nor are we convinced, however, that *Schneider*, *Bussey*, and *Cotton* must be overturned. In *Schneider*, the court stated that "[f]inancial inability exists where requiring payment of fees would strip that party of her means of support or undermine her financial stability."<sup>6</sup> The court further noted that it considered the parties' relative earning capacities, the parties' shares of the marital assets, and the child support order before concluding that the circuit court had not erred when it ordered each party to pay their own fees. *Id.* at

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12[b] "Permanent [Indefinite] Maintenance Affirmed."

<sup>3</sup> *In re Marriage of Schneider*, 214 Ill. 2d 152 (2005).

<sup>4</sup> *In re Marriage of Schneider*, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 174 (2005)

<sup>5</sup> Citing 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2014).

<sup>6</sup> Citing: *In re Marriage of Schneider*, 214 Ill. 2d at 174, in turn, citing *In re Marriage of Puls*, 268 Ill. App. 3d 882, 889 (1994).

The Court next incorrectly referenced the 1992 *Pagano* decision (*Pagano II*)<sup>8</sup> as being one where the Court had previously found that the petitioner's financial stability would have been undermined had she been required to pay her own attorney's fees. A reading of the Court's *Pagano II* decision indicates that it merely affirmed the trial court's decision on remand, but there was no mention of petitioner's being undermined without a fee award within *Pagano II*.

The Court concluded:

The Court held "it is clear that inability to pay standard was never intended to limit wards of attorney fees to those situation in which a party could show a \$0 bank account." A "party is unable to pay if, after consideration of all of the relevant statutory factors, the court finds that requiring the party to pay the entirety of the fees would undermine his or her financial stability."

The Court noted that section 508(a) of the IMDMA instructs us to turn to Section 503(j) in contribution proceedings. Subsection 503(j), in turn, instructs the court to look at subsection 503(d) (the criteria for dividing marital property). When the court awards maintenance, section 503(j) instructs the court to also consider the second 504(a) (criteria for awarding maintenance). In applying sections 508, 503(j), 503(d), and 504(a) of the IMDMA, the Court found the trial court not abuse its discretion in awarding the former wife \$160,000 in total attorney's fees. The trial court properly examined: the award of net marital assets of \$4.148 million to Tuke in the divorce, the depletion of her assets due to payment of post-decree attorney fees,<sup>9</sup> her minimal prospects of substantially increasing her retirement account, and her minimal capacity for employment. The Court noted the trial court's finding that Tuke had enjoyed a lavish standard of living during the marriage and that she had foregone her career to raise the parties' children. The Court further noted that the former husband received net marital assets of \$3.137 million at the time of the divorce. Yet at the trial on the petition to modify maintenance, the Heroy had \$5 million in assets in addition to his non-marital interest in his family business, real estate held by that his business, and his non-marital art collection. He also had an investment account valued at \$932,175 which was expected to grow.

**Conclusion:** The Illinois Supreme court ruled in essence that the trial court rather than the appellate court had struck the proper balance in in applying the statutory factors, as well as what this author calls the relative ability-to-pay standard. In her initial petition to the Illinois Supreme Court, Tuke had asserted that her attorney fees at that point exceeded \$1 million. In making its ruling, the Court reasoned that when the legislature adopted the Leveling amendments it had intended to incorporate in a sense the inability/ability standard that had been part in parcel to Illinois law.<sup>10</sup> It is suggested, however, that the intent of the Leveling amendments had been in fact to prevent a party from using his or her financial relative financial strength to win a war of attrition. This was recognized by the Court when it stated, "The legislative debates regarding the Leveling Amendments indicate that

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<sup>7</sup> In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 19.

<sup>8</sup> In re Marriage of Pagano, 154 Ill. 2d 174, 191 (1992) (*Pagano II*).

<sup>9</sup> At the time of the trial on the petition to modify maintenance, the former wife had assets valued at \$2.345 million and the Court noted that the depletion of her assets was largely because of her payment of attorney fees.

<sup>10</sup> In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 15. (Noting that the parties in *Schneider* did not dispute the standard to be applied and that the language in Section 508(a) referring to the court's considering "the financial sources of the parties" had not been amended despite repeated references to inability-to-pay standard.

the drafters were concerned that one party could use his or her superior assets to force the other to settle or not contest various issues in dissolution proceedings.”<sup>11</sup> The inability/ability standard is a relic of pre-Leveling case law. *Heroy II* approves of the language in the 1984 *Weinberg* case<sup>12</sup> stating, “[I]t is not necessary for the spouse seeking the fees to divest her capital assets [citation], deplete her means of support, or undermine her economic stability [citations] in order to pay [the attorney fees].” But by not relegating the inability-to-pay standard to the ash-heap of history the Court allowed too much reliance on the previous case-law standard. Since the Court did not abandon entirely the inability to pay mantra, it would be best of the legislature would take up the challenge presented by the Court’s opinion and provide that inability to pay one’s attorney fees no longer is the standard. That could be done additional language to the purposes section of the IMDMA at section 103 consistent with the original legislative debate when the Leveling amendments were passed.

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***Brackett* — Trial Court Must Conduct Hearing on Previously Filed Contribution Petition:**

Another significant case addressing the Leveling Amendments was the *Brackett* case in which I was the appellate lawyer for Mrs. Brackett. *Brackett* held that following the filing of a petition for contribution for fees, the trial court must conduct a hearing on the petition. [\*IRMO Brackett\*](#), 309 Ill.App.3d 329 (2d Dist. 1999). One question in *Brackett* was whether a separate hearing is necessary for a contribution petition. *Brackett* held:

We, however, temper our agreement with *McGuire* by cautioning against too literal a reading of section 503(j). We do not read section 503(j) as requiring an additional hearing, which would further burden already overburdened trial courts, but, rather, as requiring a trial court to hear, through testimony or otherwise, additional proofs when a petition for contribution is filed in accordance with section 503(j) in the context of preexisting proceedings. If the trial court wishes to hold a separate and distinct hearing on the petition, it has the discretion to do so.

***Selinger* -- Appellate Court Affirmed Denial of Separate Fee Hearing Where Not Sought on Timely Basis:** A 2004 Fourth District opinion addresses whether a separate hearing is required on a contribution petition. In *IRMO Selinger*, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 622 (4<sup>th</sup> Dist., 2004), the appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of any right to contribution. The wife in *Selinger* earned approximately \$37,000 per year from her job as a registered nurse while the husband earned more than \$100,000 from his various jobs. Regarding the issue of whether a separate fee hearing must be conducted, the appellate court stated:

The lack of a hearing here is not dispositive. The assets and liabilities of the two parties were already before the court, as was the amount of Pamela's attorney fees. We fail to see what other evidence had to be presented for the court to rule on Pamela's request. Further, we note Pamela waited to file her request for fees until several weeks after the close of

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<sup>11</sup>In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 17. (“Haken court relied on these amendments as evidence that the legislature intended to do away with the inability to pay standard. 394 Ill. App. 3d at 162.”)

<sup>12</sup>In re Marriage of Weinberg, 125 Ill. App. 3d 904, 919 (1984).

proofs in this case, at a time when the parties were not in person before the court. It was then up to her to call it to the court's attention if she believed an additional hearing was necessary prior to issuance of the court's order. Failing that, it was then Pamela's responsibility to call to the court's attention its failure to hold a hearing within 30 days of the entry of the order and before this appeal was filed. The failure to hold a hearing would have been easily correctable in the trial court. Her failure to take these steps does not allow her to now challenge the trial court's alleged failure to hold a hearing on her motion for contribution to attorney fees. See *Minear*, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 1079-80.

As to the court's finding no contribution to attorney fees was warranted, we find no abuse of discretion. In view of our decision to award permanent maintenance in a greater amount, disparity in income levels between the parties will not be large enough to require contribution to Pamela's attorney fees.

*DeLarco* — **Four Significant Holdings:** *IRMO DeLarco*, 313 Ill.App.3d 107 (2nd Dist. 2000) was the next significant appellate court case involving the fee contribution statute. It had several significant rulings, mostly related to contribution petitions. The *DeLarco* court ruled:

1. **Contribution Awards Does not Equate to Fee Equalization:** The fee equalizing portion of the statute, §501(c-1)(3) of the IMDMA applies only to temporary fee awards. Equalization does not apply at the contribution hearing. The holding in *DeLarco* regarding “fee equalization” not being a part of the contribution statute is significant in light of the potentially confusing language of the statute. The interim fee portion of the statute states that “**unless otherwise ordered**” all fees paid shall be deemed an advance against the marital estate. The query was what the phrase “unless otherwise ordered” refers to.
2. **Advance Against the Marital Estate — Court May Consider Relevant Economic Circumstances of Parties:** While attorney's fees paid by each party from marital assets may be deemed as an advance against the marital estate, the trial court may consider in a contribution hearing the relevant economic circumstances of each party in the apportionment of marital property. This is in line with both *DeLarco* and *Holthaus*.
3. **Reasonableness is a Mandatory Factor:** Although §503 does not mention reasonableness for contribution hearing, the reasonableness requirement of §508 also applies to contribution fees.
4. **Reasonableness Finding Re Other Party No Effect on 508(c) Petition:** Finding of reasonableness or unreasonableness in contribution hearing may not be asserted against the attorney in a hearing for attorney's fees against either a client or former client.
5. **Business Records — Actual Timeslips Must be Made Available to Other Party if These are Original Documents — An Incentive to Direct Input:** Where a lawyer does

not directly input timeslips into a time and billing program, for the records to be admitted under the business records exception of the hearsay rule, the original documents must be in court or made available to the opposing party. The party seeking admission of the summaries must also be able to provide the testimony of a competent witness or witnesses who has seen the original documents and can testify to the facts contained in the individual timeslips.

***Schneider* – No Contribution Award Where Parties Equally Unreasonably Litigious:**

*IRMO Schneider*, 343 Ill. App. 3d 628, 1295 (2nd Dist., 2003) (*the same case as the Illinois Supreme Court case addressing personal goodwill*) ruled that the trial court did not err in refusing to award contribution toward attorney's fees where the parties “were equally unreasonable, litigious, and quarrelsome throughout the divorce proceedings, resulting in an unnecessarily expensive divorce.” The appellate court also stated, “Furthermore, although Jodi's earning potential pales in comparison to Earl's, she has failed to show an inability to pay her own attorney fees. See *McCoy*, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 132 (ability to pay does not mean ability to pay without pain or sacrifice).” Moreover, the appellate court commented that the wife was awarded a disproportionate and substantial share of the marital estate (worth approximately \$326,000). *Schneider* is the newest of a line of cases which states that the court did not make a contribution award in a case with litigation where both parties are to blame resulting in an expensive and litigious divorce where there is no showing of “inability to pay.” See, e.g., *IRMO Aleshire*, 273 Ill.App.3d 81(3d Dist.1995) [In cross-petitions for enforcement the court may apportion attorney's fees in a manner that reflects the parties' relative culpability.] *IRMO Mandei*, 222 Ill.App.3d 933 (4th Dist. 1991). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering each party to pay own fees where the fees were generated largely from the result of the parties' unwillingness to compromise.

*IRMO Pond*, 379 Ill.App.3d 982 (2<sup>nd</sup> Dist., 2008), will be analyzed at length because there are very few cases which involve reversals of a failure to make a contribution award. In fact, the appellate court was able to cite only three previous appellate court cases, each prior to the “Leveling” amendments. On the same day that the parties signed the marital settlement agreement, the trial court entertained the parties' petitions for contribution to attorney fees. The trial court denied both petitions. The trial court stated:

The issue of contribution is set forth in the attorney's petitions and essentially request the court to, after looking at the division of property and the relative financial circumstances of the property [sic] after the division of this property is made and any other factors, there being no maintenance, that would be the other major consideration, looking at their incomes and ability to pay, the Court is going to deny any relief by [petitioner] in this case. The Court finds that, as I say, at the end of the day, the economic circumstances available to [respondent] would not, in this Court's judgment, constitute \*\*\* an equitable basis for him to make a contribution towards any attorney's fees that will be paid. So [petitioner's] request for contribution to attorney's fees is denied.

The appellate court cited *Minear* in support of the proposition that “Inability to pay does not require a showing of destitution, and the party seeking fees is not required to divest himself of capital assets

before requesting fees. It stated, “Rather, a party is unable to pay her fees if the payment would strip her of her means of support or undermine her financial stability. *Schneider*, 214 Ill. 2d at 174. In determining whether and in what amount to award attorney fees, the court should consider the allocation of assets and liabilities, maintenance, and the relative earning abilities of the parties. *IRMO Suriano*, 324 Ill. App. 3d 839, 852 (2001). Regarding earnings, the court may consider both current and prospective income. *IRMO Selinger*, 351 Ill. App. 3d 611, 622 (2004).”

In *Pond*, the ex-husband had agreed in the settlement agreement (MSA) to pay \$5,000 toward attorney’s fees which was apparently due to violations as to discovery issues. The court then pointed out that the fee award was not one made per §508(b) but per §508(a) – incorporating the contribution provisions by reference. The ex-wife argued that the court could consider a party’s conduct as to the reason for the litigation, citing *IRMO Ziemer*, 189 Ill. App. 3d 966, 969 (1989). The ex-wife also argued that her ex-husband should be required to contribute toward the \$63,000 balance of fees owed because she had already borrowed \$28,000 to pay her attorney, because the house which was the majority of the estate awarded to her was illiquid and because her ex-husband could afford to pay via a contribution award and make payments over time. The ex-husband argued in part that he had over \$38,000 in credit card debt and he was therefore left with no money after paying the credit card debt. The ex-husband thus argued that while his ex-wife had similar debt (excluding attorney fees), she also has the house. He also urged that the ex-wife had waived the argument that he could make installment payments, because she did not offer such a proposal in the trial court. The ex-husband’s further arguments were:

On the subject of income, respondent points out that petitioner was earning \$38,422 in 2005 when she quit her job, and he argues that the trial court was imputing an income to her of \$25,000 for college contribution purposes only. Respondent maintains that we should not ignore that petitioner quit her job in the middle of the proceedings and then asked for contribution based on a lower imputed income for college purposes. Respondent further argues that petitioner received 65% of the assets to balance his higher income. According to respondent, petitioner already benefitted from the differences in income but now seeks to double dip.

The appellate court determined that the ex-wife did not waive the issue of seeking payments over time by now raising it at the trial court level. Because the ex-wife quit her job earning \$38,000, the appellate court stated that it was reasonable to consider that her future income would likely rise. See *Selinger*, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 622 (court may consider both current and prospective income). Regarding the ex-husband’s income, the settlement agreement recited that he earned \$93,610 in 2005 and had a projected 2006 income of \$83,000 based upon his October year to date income. The appellate court focused its attention on the cases reversing the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees: *IRMO Carpenter*, 286 Ill. App. 3d 969 (1997), *IRMO Haas*, 215 Ill. App. 3d 959 (1991), and *Sullivan v. Sullivan*, 68 Ill. App. 3d 242 (1979).

Those cases break down as follows as to the income comparison:

Case	Amt Sought	Wife	Note	Husband	Note
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<i>Carpenter</i>	\$3,543	\$12,000		\$45,000	Estimated for H
<i>Hass</i>	\$5,647	\$15,000	Less Than	\$49,000	Excluding Bonus
<i>Sullivan</i>		\$4,176	W's Gross	\$14,676	Net figure for H

Applying the facts, the appellate court stated:

Petitioner clearly demonstrated that she is unable to pay her attorney fees without invading her capital assets or undermining her financial stability. Although petitioner received a greater portion of the marital assets, they consist largely of retirement accounts and illiquid assets such as the house. Petitioner also received around two-thirds of the liabilities, giving her over \$100,000 in debts. These debts are in addition to petitioner's attorney fee debts of over \$91,000 and the approximately \$52,000 debt she incurred to pay respondent his share of the home's equity. These circumstances, along with petitioner's limited income, show that petitioner is unable to pay her attorney fees.

We also conclude that petitioner showed that respondent is able to pay at least a portion of her attorney fees. While respondent may still have about \$20,000 in credit card debt if he applies his remaining equity from the house to the outstanding credit card balance, this is his only remaining debt, and he has no child support or maintenance obligations. Respondent's income of over \$83,000 is over three times petitioner's imputed income and more than twice her previous income at Dick Pond Shoes. The courts in *Carpenter*, *Haas*, and *Sullivan* all emphasized the differences in the parties' incomes in determining that the trial courts abused their discretion in refusing to order attorney fee contributions. Though respondent argues that petitioner has already benefitted from the differences in income by receiving 65% of the marital assets, as stated, in determining whether and in what amount to award attorney fees, the court should take into account the allocation of assets and liabilities, maintenance, and the parties' relative earning abilities. Thus in analyzing this issue, we are cognizant of petitioner's greater assets. But we also consider that this benefit was diluted by her waiver of maintenance and her assumption of a much greater share of the liabilities. We agree with respondent that he should not be responsible for the entire remaining balance of petitioner's attorney fees. At the same time, considering the nature of petitioner's assets, her vast debts, and the significant income disparities, we believe that the trial court abused its discretion by not ordering respondent to contribute to petitioner's attorney fees in any amount beyond the \$5,000 he already paid.

Accordingly, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the contribution award.

***Nesbitt – Standards in Contribution Hearings and Bundled Billing Statements:*** [\*IRMO Nesbitt\*](#), (First Dist., 2007) involves Schiller, DuCanto and Fleck's (SDF) fee contribution petition seeking \$1.109 million in fees (\$227,000 being previously paid). After the initial filing, wife's counsel filed two supplemental fee petitions seeking for a four month period of an additional \$111,784 and for a three month period of \$228,779.

One of the factors in this case was that in the SDF billing statements there is a listing of tasks during a day and a listing of the total time per day but not a breakdown per task. The SDF policy is that the employee may aggregate the time for all of the work on a given day. It was noted that while some associates itemize their time that this is eliminated when billing records are sent to the client.

The appellate decision addressed the reasons for the very high attorney's fees. David Hopkins of SDF conceded that the charges for litigation were "overwhelmingly high when compared to [Lisa's] share of the marital estate" but explained the unique circumstances and complexities of the case. A lawyer for the first law firm representing the husband testified that the husband "was very angry at Lisa because he had been thrown out of his house." The husband terminated his relationship with his firm because they were "not aggressive enough in representing Mr. Nesbitt." That firm filed an action to recover their fees and the husband filed a lawsuit against the lawyer individually and against his firm. The ex-husband conceded that in a settlement proposal generated in 2001, he wrote, "If Lisa chooses not to come to a reasonable agreement as set forth below, we can simply go to court and have a full, blown out litigation slash war." In previous years the husband's gross income had been over \$1M but in 2004 it was approximately \$400,000. The husband had an interest in three businesses and received a yearly salary. The trial court ultimately "ordered Bruce to contribute \$700,000 to Lisa's attorney fees because "Bruce holds a financial position far superior to [Lisa's] and is well able to help defray her fees, and because the Court believes that Bruce protracted the litigation out of sheer vindictiveness." There were appeals and cross-appeals and the appellate court generally affirmed the trial court's decision.

The critical discussion on appeal addressed the bundled services of SDF and stated:

Though not explicitly required by section 503(j), we have found that contribution awards under that section must be reasonable. *Hasabnis*, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 596 ("Section 503(j) does not expressly require the award of fees be reasonable, but since we cannot envision a grant of legislative authority that tells judges to be unreasonable, we read the statute as incorporating a reasonability requirement"). Bruce, relying primarily on our holding in *Hasabnis*, argues on appeal that "the trial court's finding—that it is impossible to tell with precision whether all the work performed was reasonable—should have resulted in a denial of all of the fees requested in [Lisa's] contribution petition," because such a finding is necessary to award contribution under section 503(j) of the Act. We disagree.

**The appellate court stated that based upon *Hasabnis* did not require the necessity of fees but did require the fees to be reasonable.** The court cited this case for the proposition that, "While a trial court may review the petitioning party's billing records, **it is not required to do so.**" But the court recognized that *DeLarco*, 313 Ill. App. 3d 107 (2000), had held that the trial court " 'must,' in making an award of fees pursuant to a contribution petition, 'consider whether the attorney fees charged by the petitioning party's attorney are reasonable.'

#### **Fee Equalization and "Unless Otherwise Ordered" of the Interim Fee Statute:**

*IRMO Holthaus* has addressed most directly the "unless otherwise ordered" language of §501(c-1)(2) of IMDMA that is discussed above when addressing the *DeLarco* holdings. Despite the potential waiver issue not being argued at the trial court level, the *Holthaus* appellate court stated, "We choose to address

Angeline's contention because it is necessary to the development of a sound body of precedent concerning the application of section 501(c-1)(2) of the Act." Thus, this case presents an instance of what might be called judicial activism. The appellate court in *Holthaus* stated:

The plain language of section 501(c-1)(2) makes apparent that the trial court is required to treat the parties' attorney fees as advances, "[u]nless otherwise ordered." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(2) (West 2006); see also *In re Marriage of Beyer*, 324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 314 (2001) (noting that section 501(c-1)(2) creates a presumption that attorney fees will be treated as advances, but that the presumption does not apply where the court orders otherwise).

Here, the trial court ordered otherwise when following trial it ordered that, subject to the division of the marital estate, which was skewed so as to compensate Nicholas for attorney fees incurred as a result of Angeline's behavior during the proceedings, *the parties were to be responsible for their respective attorney fees. Accordingly, the trial court's decision falls squarely within the confines of the statute.*

The *Holthaus* court then stated:

Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring the parties to be responsible for their respective attorney fees. See *In re Marriage of Bussey*, 108 Ill. 2d 286, 299 (1985) ("The awarding of attorney fees and the proportion to be paid are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal, absent an abuse of discretion").

**Is Reasonableness a Permissive or Mandatory Factor? Contrast *DeLarco* and *Hasabnis*:** As discussed above, *DeLarco* ruled that in contribution petitions, fees must be shown to be reasonable. You might respond by believing that of course contribution awards should only be made if the fees were reasonable. The problem is that the specific contribution portion of the statute – §503(j) never mentions reasonableness. As applicable to pre-decree dissolution cases, it just states that the court shall make contribution awards based upon the maintenance factors if maintenance is awarded or otherwise based upon the property factors.

While the 2000 Second District *DeLarco* decision appeared to put an end to the query about whether fees in contribution petitions must be reasonable, the First District chose not to adopt the reasoning of *DeLarco* in *Hasabnis*, a case involving the Schiller, DuCanto & Fleck law firm. The legal issue in this case was whether a party who is seeking a contribution award should be required to disclose detailed billing records. The Schiller firm brought a motion to quash the discovery request in this regard and the trial court granted this motion. The appellate court affirmed holding that reasonableness of fees is a *permissive* factor in contribution proceedings rather than a mandatory factor. *IRMO Hasabnis*, 322 Ill.App.3d 582 (1st Dist, 2001), GDR 01-95. The language of *Hasabnis* was curious. It states:

We realize one court has held that under section 508(a) the trial judge "must," in making

an award of fees pursuant to a contribution petition, "consider whether the attorney fees charged by the petitioning party's attorney are reasonable." *In re Marriage of DeLarco*, \*\*\*. Although we do not see that requirement in any of the relevant statutes, we need not decide whether we will part company with *DeLarco* on this point. It is clear to us the trial court did examine the amount of fees [the wife] had paid and still owed her attorneys. The trial court was asked by [the wife] to award fees it found "equitable, just, and in accordance with the provisions of section 503(j) \* \* \*." We believe the trial court did so.

The argument that reasonableness is a "permissive" factor is the argument set forth in David Hopkins' Illinois Bar Journal article, "'Leveling the Playing Field in Divorce: Questions and Answers about the New Law.'" 85 IBJ, 410 (Sept. 1997). Hopkins suggests, "If contribution awards were to be determined on the basis of traditional §508 criteria — i.e., reasonableness and necessity of fees — the conflict of interest problem posted by prior law would have persisted." Hopkins had urged that contribution awards should be determined "in a manner akin to other types of debts in the divorcing couple's marital estate." I disagree in light of the language in Section 508 of the IMDMA. The first sentence of §508 states, "The court \*\*\* and after considering the financial resources of the parties, may order any party to pay a **reasonable** amount for his own or the other party's costs and attorney's fees."

In any event, while *Hasabnis* tried to make a distinction in stating that necessity is not an element of the contribution statute but that fees still must be reasonable. The specific quote as to reasonableness states: "Section 503(j) does not expressly require the award of fees be reasonable, but since we cannot envision a grant of legislative authority that tells judges to be unreasonable, we read the statute as incorporating a reasonability requirement." While the appellate court gave lip service to reasonableness being a factor, it then went on to appear to reject this assumption. Picking up from the argument made in the Hopkins' Illinois Bar Journal article the court stated, "**A critical examination of the reasonableness of the petitioner's attorneys' fees would not be consistent with the obvious goals of section 503(j) -- to avoid conflicts of interest between petitioner and her attorney and to preserve the lawyer-client privilege.**" Again, I disagree. As pointed out in *DeLarco*, a finding of reasonableness or unreasonableness in a contribution hearing may not be asserted against the attorney in a hearing for attorney's fees against either a client or former client.

It is urged that the First District appellate court decision is poorly reasoned and the Second District's *DeLarco* decision was better reasoned. It does not make sense to exact the supposed conflict of interest between lawyer and his or her client when he is pursuing a fee contribution petition as against the depth of Illinois law which requires fees to be reasonable. It is urged that the court is not in a position to properly determine whether fees are reasonable unless detailed billing records are submitted.

**Gattone — A Second 2nd District Case Holding Fees Must be Reasonable:** We have one more case which conflicts with the First District's approach in rejecting reasonableness as a mandatory consideration in contribution petitions: [\*IRMO Gattone\*](#), 317 Ill.App.3d 346 (2d Dist. 2000). Consistent with *DeLarco*, the Second District *Gattone* court held that if the court makes a contribution award, it should make a determination that the fees requested are reasonable.

**Pond – Second District Case Comprehensively Addressing Ability to Pay and Allocation**

**Factors:** *IRMO Pond*, (2<sup>nd</sup> Dist., 2008) the same day that the parties signed the marital settlement agreement, the trial court heard the parties' cross-petitions for contribution to attorney fees. The trial court denied both petitions. The trial court stated:

"The issue of contribution is set forth in the attorney's petitions and essentially request the court to, after looking at the division of property and the relative financial circumstances of the property [sic] after the division of this property is made and any other factors, there being no maintenance, that would be the other major consideration, looking at their incomes and ability to pay, the Court is going to deny any relief by [petitioner] in this case. The Court finds that, as I say, at the end of the day, the economic circumstances available to [respondent] would not, in this Court's judgment, constitute \*\*\* an equitable basis for him to make a contribution towards any attorney's fees that will be paid. So [petitioner's] request for contribution to attorney's fees is denied.

The appellate court cited *Miner* in support of the proposition that "Inability to pay does not require a showing of destitution, and the party seeking fees is not required to divest himself of capital assets before requesting fees. It stated, "Rather, a party is unable to pay her fees if the payment would strip her of her means of support or undermine her financial stability. *Schneider*, 214 Ill. 2d at 174. In determining whether and in what amount to award attorney fees, the court should consider the allocation of assets and liabilities, maintenance, and the relative earning abilities of the parties. *IRMO Suriano*, 324 Ill. App. 3d 839, 852 (2001). Regarding earnings, the court may consider both current and prospective income. *IRMO Selinger*, 351 Ill. App. 3d 611, 622 (2004).

I analyze *Pond* at length because there are very few cases with actual reversals of a failure to make a contribution award. In fact, the appellate court was able to cite only three previous appellate court cases, each prior to the "Leveling" amendments.

In this case the ex-husband had agreed in the MSA to pay \$5,000 toward attorney's fees which was apparently due to violations as to discovery issues. The court then pointed out that the fee award was not one made per §508(b) but per §508(a) – incorporating the contribution provisions by reference. The ex-wife argued that the court could consider a party's conduct as to the reason for the litigation, citing *IRMO Ziemer*, 189 Ill. App. 3d 966, 969 (1989). The ex-wife also argued that her ex-husband should be required to contribute toward the \$63,000 balance of fees owed because she had already borrowed \$28,000 to pay her attorney, because the house which was the majority of the estate awarded to her was illiquid and because her ex-husband could afford to pay via a contribution award payments over time. The ex-husband argued in part that he had over \$38,000 in credit card debt and he was therefore left with no money after paying the credit card debt. The ex-husband thus argued that while his ex-wife had similar debt (excluding attorney fees), she also has the house. He also urged that the ex-wife had waived the argument that he could make installment payments, because she did not offer such a proposal in the trial court. The ex-husband's further arguments were:

On the subject of income, respondent points out that petitioner was earning \$38,422 in 2005 when she quit her job, and he argues that the trial court was imputing an income to

her of \$25,000 for college contribution purposes only. Respondent maintains that we should not ignore that petitioner quit her job in the middle of the proceedings and then asked for contribution based on a lower imputed income for college purposes.

Respondent further argues that petitioner received 65% of the assets to balance his higher income. According to respondent, petitioner already benefitted from the differences in income but now seeks to double dip.

The appellate court determined that the ex-wife did not waive the issue of seeking payments over time by now raising it at the trial court level. Because the ex-wife quit her job earning \$38,000, the appellate court stated that it was reasonable to consider that her future income would likely rise. See *Selinger*, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 622 (court may consider both current and prospective income). Regarding the ex-husband's income, the settlement agreement recited that he earned \$93,610 in 2005 and had a projected 2006 income of \$83,000 based upon his October year to date income. The appellate court focused its attention on the cases reversing the trial court's denial of attorney's fees. *IRMO Carpenter*, 286 Ill. App. 3d 969 (1997), *IRMO Haas*, 215 Ill. App. 3d 959 (1991), and *Sullivan v. Sullivan*, 68 Ill. App. 3d 242 (1979).

Those cases break down as follows as to the income comparison:

Case	Amt Sought	Wife	Note	Husband	Note
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<i>Sullivan</i>		\$4,176	W's Gross	\$14,676	Net figure for H

Applying the facts, the appellate court stated:

Petitioner clearly demonstrated that she is unable to pay her attorney fees without invading her capital assets or undermining her financial stability. Although petitioner received a greater portion of the marital assets, they consist largely of retirement accounts and illiquid assets such as the house. Petitioner also received around two-thirds of the liabilities, giving her over \$100,000 in debts. These debts are in addition to petitioner's attorney fee debts of over \$91,000 and the approximately \$52,000 debt she incurred to pay respondent his share of the home's equity. These circumstances, along with petitioner's limited income, show that petitioner is unable to pay her attorney fees.

We also conclude that petitioner showed that respondent is able to pay at least a portion of her attorney fees. While respondent may still have about \$20,000 in credit card debt if he applies his remaining equity from the house to the outstanding credit card balance, this is his only remaining debt, and he has no child support or maintenance obligations. Respondent's income of over \$83,000 is over three times petitioner's imputed income and more than twice her previous income at Dick Pond Shoes. The courts in *Carpenter*, *Haas*, and *Sullivan* all emphasized the differences in the parties' incomes in determining that the trial courts abused their discretion in refusing to order attorney fee contributions. Though respondent argues that petitioner has already benefitted from the differences in income by

receiving 65% of the marital assets, as stated, in determining whether and in what amount to award attorney fees, the court should take into account the allocation of assets and liabilities, maintenance, and the parties' relative earning abilities. Thus in analyzing this issue, we are cognizant of petitioner's greater assets. But we also consider that this benefit was diluted by her waiver of maintenance and her assumption of a much greater share of the liabilities. We agree with respondent that he should not be responsible for the entire remaining balance of petitioner's attorney fees. At the same time, considering the nature of petitioner's assets, her vast debts, and the significant income disparities, we believe that the trial court abused its discretion by not ordering respondent to contribute to petitioner's attorney fees in any amount beyond the \$5,000 he already paid.

Accordingly, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the contribution award.

*IRMO Bolte*, 2012 IL App (3d) 110791, addressed another post-decree attorney's fee case where the appellate court reversed the trial court's award of only half of the ex-wife's fees.

The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision regarding attorney's fees based upon the trial court's flawed analysis of work that was reasonable and necessary. The trial court based its fee decision, in part, on its determination that the wife was barred from seeking permanent maintenance because of the title placed on maintenance as being "rehabilitative."

The appellate court stated:

Furthermore, the research and discovery conducted by counsel in regard to Terry's financial status at the time of the September 1 hearing was relevant to a meaningful review of both the maintenance and attorney fees issues. To find otherwise disregards the statutory directives of both sections 510(a-5) and 504(a). \*\*\* Section 503(j)(2) provides that any award of contribution for fees and costs to one party from the other party shall be based on the criteria for division of marital property under this section 503 and, if maintenance has been awarded, on the criteria for an award of maintenance under section 504 (750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) (West 2010)).

The appellate court then reviewed the parties' very different financial circumstances including the former husband's pensions and pension payments, his current wife's income from employment and the limited cash flow of the former wife. The appellate court then stated:

The trial court acknowledged the obvious great disparity between Sue's and Terry's actual earnings and their earning capacities. Sue depends solely on social security disability benefits and maintenance payments, and her earning capacity is virtually eliminated due to her disability. A thorough review of the record makes clear that Sue has proven she lacks the ability to pay, and conversely, Terry is more than able. Sue is not required to show destitution in order for the trial court to award her attorney fees. See *Gable*, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 700. The trial court, nonetheless, ordered Terry to pay only half of Sue's fees,

predominately on the basis that her claim for increased maintenance was "nonmeritorious." To the contrary, it was imperative for Sue's counsel to pursue information regarding Terry's finances in order to have both a meaningful review of the maintenance award and the petition for attorney fees. The trial court abused its discretion in ruling on Sue's request for attorney fees.

*IRMO Beeler*, (2nd Dist., 2004) involved a post-decree fee awarded regarding minor issues in which a Chicago law firm and their client sought \$70,000 of attorney's fees from the ex-husband in a "contribution" award. Note that based on the 2009 amendments this would no longer have been a case involving a contribution petition but simply a petition for attorney's fees against the other party pursuant to §508(a). In any event, the Chicago Law firm represented the mother in disputes regarding summer camp and vacation schedules. The final bill from that firm using round numbers was \$73,500 of attorney's fees which was broken down as follows: \$7,000 for spring break of 2002 issues; \$5,800 for summer vacation 2003 issues; \$15,200 for a "financial disparity analysis"; \$14,520 for obtaining and responding to discovery; \$ 3,200 for responding to a summary judgment motion; \$14,100 for trial preparation; \$800 for ancillary matters including mediation; and \$2,200 for costs. The law firm filed various fee petitions against the ex-husband and the trial court found that "the sum of \$70,000+ is not reasonable and that the reasonable sum at best is \$10,000." The ex-husband [who had an estate worth over \$6 million] was ordered to pay \$6,000 of the ex-wife's attorney's fees. The parties were to equally divide the cost of summer camp fees and certain camp supplies.

The appellate court concluded that the trial court was within its discretion to determine that only \$10,000 of the more than \$70,000 was reasonable. Regarding the contribution petition, the appellate court cited previous precedent as follows:

The party seeking attorney fees has the burden of establishing an inability to pay those fees and the ability of the other spouse to do so. *Schneider*, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 637. Financial inability to pay the fees exists where the payment would strip a party of his or her means of support and undermine the party's economic stability, but the party need not show destitution. *In re Marriage of Carpel*, 232 Ill. App. 3d 806, 832 (1992). Still, the ability to pay does not mean the ability to pay without pain or sacrifice. *Schneider*, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 638.

In another striking finding the appellate court stated:

Appellants argue that "[c]learly, [respondent] is unable to pay the balance of her attorneys' fees in the amount of \$67,304 (\$73,304 less \$6,000 award)." Appellants misconstrue the issue, as the question is whether respondent can pay \$4,000, which is the remainder of the \$10,000 attorney fee award deemed "reasonable" by the trial court.

Because of the above quote, the appellate court believed that the interests of the law firm were potentially adverse to that of their client, the ex-wife, when it stated:



Both respondent and [the law firm] are represented by the same attorney on appeal even though their interests potentially conflict. For example, it was in [the law firm's] interest to obtain a ruling that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding just \$10,000 in attorney fees and that \$73,490.82 was a reasonable amount of fees. However, such a ruling could have been adverse to respondent, as we might still have held that the trial court did not err in apportioning 40% of the fees to respondent. Respondent would then be liable to [that law firm] for \$29,396.28, rather than just the \$4,000 she owed under the trial court's decision. As such, it was contrary to respondent's interest to challenge the trial court's ruling that \$10,000 was a reasonable amount of attorney fees. The court then instructed, "In this case, there is no indication that appellants' attorney did not make the necessary disclosures and obtain appellants' consent. We point out the conflict of interest only to remind practitioners of the potential perils involved with joint representation.

It is suggested that the appellate court in *Beeler* went beyond the issues which were specifically in dispute because of its apparent displeasure that a post-decree dispute involving such relatively minor matters totaled more than \$70,000. The appellate court seemed to limit fees that could be sought from the firm's own client to the remaining \$4,000 instead, of the remaining \$64,000+ owed to them by the terms of their contract. A fee petition against a lawyer's own client is not limited to the fees which are customary in the community. The standards for a fee petition under §508(c) differ from a contribution petition where fees are more limited. This decision was at first published and it was changed to a Rule 23 order.

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**Timing for Filing “Contribution” Petition or Petition for Fees under §508(a):** Case law conflicts regarding the timing issues for filing a contribution petition. Section 508(a) in pertinent part *now* states (with the “redlining showing the 2009 amendments):

The court from time to time, after due notice and hearing, and after considering the financial resources of the parties, may order any party to pay a reasonable amount for his own or the other party's costs and attorney's fees. \*\*\* At the conclusion of any pre-judgment dissolution proceeding under this subsection~~the case~~, contribution to attorney's fees and costs may be awarded from the opposing party in accordance with subsection (j) of Section 503 and in any other proceeding under this subsection.

So, 503(j) no longer applies to post-decree petitions. It is only incorporated by reference when addressing pre-decree situations – with the specific reference being “pre-judgment dissolution” proceedings. The pertinent parts of §503(j) of the IMDMA that apply to pre-judgment dissolution proceedings (and not to pre-judgment parenting cases under the maxim of construction that the inclusion of one means the exclusion of the other) are:

**Time for Hearing — After Close of Proofs and Before Judgment is Entered:** **After proofs have closed** in the final hearing *on all other issues* between the parties \*\*\* and before judgment is entered, a party's petition for contribution to fees and costs incurred in

the proceeding shall be **heard and decided**, in accordance with the following provisions:

**Not Later than 14 30 Days After Close of Proofs / Such Other Period as**

**Court Orders:** (1) A petition for contribution, if not **filed** before the final hearing on other issues between the parties, shall be **filed no later than 14 30 days after the closing of proofs in the final hearing or within such other period as the court orders**. [Note the change with the Family Law Study Committee 2016 Legislation from 30 to 14 days.]

***IRMO Konchar* — 2000 Case [Prior to 2009 Amendments] Must be Heard and Decided before Entry of Final Judgment:** The first [and now somewhat antiquated] case which addressed the timing issue prior to more recent amendments to the statute is *IRMO Konchar*, 312 Ill.App.3d 441 (2d Dist. 2000). *Konchar* was a post-decree proceeding holding that a 503(j) contribution petition was to be heard and decided before a final judgment is entered. **“When proofs are closed and a final order/judgment is entered on the same day, a petition filed thereafter is not timely filed and should be dismissed.”**

In *Konchar*, within 30 days of the close of proofs and entry of final judgment, the father filed a petition for fees, claiming that he could not pay his own fees because he was unemployed and disabled. The trial judge, Margaret Mullen, denied the petition for attorney's fees because the petition was not heard and decided before the date the final judgment/order was entered. The father appealed. The Second District appellate court affirmed the trial court. The appellate court concluded that reading §508(a) and 503(j) together, the conclusion is that a petition for contribution fees must be heard and decided before the final judgment is entered. The opinion stated:

Here, section 508(a) of the Act provides that attorney fees may be awarded at the conclusion of a case. The fees may be awarded in accordance with section 503(j) of the Act. Section 503(j) of the Act provides that a petition for fees must be **heard and decided** after the close of proofs in the final hearing and **before judgment is entered**. However, that language is qualified by section 503(j)(1) of the Act, which provides that if a petition for fees is not filed before the final hearing, then the petition must be filed no later than 30 days after the closing of proofs in the final hearing.

\* \* \*

We conclude that, under section 503(j) of the Act, a petition for attorney fees must be heard and decided **before the final judgment is entered**. We determine that the phrase "before judgment is entered" that is presented in section 503(j) **limits subsection (1) of section 503(j) of the Act so that the 30-day extension only applies to situations where a final judgment has not been entered**.

***Macaluso* — Case Contrary to *Konchar* Holding – In Post-Divorce Proceedings No Bar until 30 Days after Entry of Judgment:** For a while, the law seemed clear that a fee petition, even in

post-judgment proceedings, must be filed before the final judgment is entered. However, the [\*Macaluso v. Macaluso\*](#), 334 Ill.App.3d 1043 (3rd Dist. 2002), GDR 02-55, decision, disagreed with *Konchar* (as discussed above in the Illinois Supreme Court *Blum* decision) and held that a petition for contribution fees in post-judgment proceedings need not be filed before final judgment is entered, and the a petition may be filed at any time before the trial court loses jurisdiction. *Macaluso* reasoned that the timing requirements of the contribution statute do not apply to post-divorce matters because §503(j)'s references to "the final hearing **on all other issues** between the parties," is specific to the bifurcated hearing required in pre-decree proceedings. I believe the *Macaluso* decision may be the better reasoned decision. Nevertheless, we have a clear conflict among the districts because the original leveling legislation was not drafted with post-divorce proceedings in mind.

What does the phrase mean – so long as the trial court has jurisdiction over the case? This is an especially interesting question considering the recent decisions being critical of prior case law regarding how some appellate decisions had interpreted jurisdiction. See, for example, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in *McCormick v. Robertson*, 2015 IL 118230.

***Blum* – Timing Requirements Apply to Pre-Decree Cases / Not Post-Decree Cases:** A 2009 Illinois Supreme Court case addresses the timing of a contribution petition in post-decree cases but unfortunately did not involve the 2009 amendments, [\*IRMO Blum\*](#), 235 Ill. 2d 21 (Ill. 2009). In *Blum*, the trial court dismissed the ex-wife's contribution petition as untimely filed under the rule of *Konchar*. The issue was whether the trial court erred in dismissing the ex-wife's petition for contribution of attorney fees as untimely. The Supreme Court stated:

We agree with the analysis of the court in *Macaluso* and the appellate court in this case. Section 508 governs attorney fees generally, including petitions for contribution of attorney fees and costs incurred in postdecree proceedings and initial dissolution proceedings. We also agree with *Macaluso's* conclusion that section 503(j) governs the procedural requirements applicable to petitions for contribution of attorney fees and costs incurred prior to the entry of final orders for dissolution of marriage. The phrase "all other issues," in section 503(j) refers to bifurcated contested trials, when the grounds are tried first and "other remaining issues" are either settled or tried separately. See 750 ILCS 5/403(e) (providing for bifurcated contested trials on issues of grounds and "other remaining issues"). Further, in the section 503 context, attorney fees are awarded in view of the total disposition of property and assets, thus justifying the 30-day requirement for filing a petition for contribution of attorney fees. Practically, a judge rarely decides "other remaining issues" immediately after a contested trial on the remaining issues. The petition for fees must, however, be presented to the judge after close of the evidence, and then attorney fees are decided as part of the overall property and asset distribution.

Thus, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erroneously dismissed the ex-wife's petition for contribution of attorney fees as untimely.

**Case Law Regarding Waiver of Right to Object to Timing re Contribution Petition or Fee Hearing against Client -- *Lindsey-Robinson* and *Baniak*:**

**Lindsey-Robinson – Participation in Contribution Hearing and No Objection:** Muddying the waters even more as to the timing issue is the *IRMO Lindsey-Robinson*, 331 Ill.App.3d 261 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2002) GDR 02-54, decision. This case stands for the proposition that there may be a waiver of the right to object to the timing of the contribution action. In this case, the appellate court ruled that the timing requirement may be waived by lack of objection and, at the hearing, by arguing to the merits of the fee petition.

***Baniak* -- Time Frame Requirements under the IMDMA are Not Necessary for Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Filing of Late Fee Petition Acceptable Where Waiver:** A recent case with similarity to *Lindsey-Robinson* – except this time in the context of a petition for fees against a lawyer’s own client – the 2011 *IRMO Baniak* case, 2011 IL App (1st) 092017 (August 9, 2011). The judgment for divorce, incorporating the MSA, was entered October 31, 2008. Attorney Dean Dussias filed his petition for setting final attorney fees on December 1, 2008, a period of 31 days after the trial court entered the divorce judgment. On December 2008, the trial court granted Dussias leave to withdraw as counsel for the former wife. On July 10, 2009, the trial court awarded \$71,347 of attorney fees to Dussias. The former wife appealed and the appellate court affirmed.

Attorney Dussias former client claimed, among other things, that Dean's fee petition was not timely filed and that he did not first seek leave to withdraw as required by the statute.

The appellate court first quoted from Section 508(c)(5) of the IMDMA:

A [fee] petition \*\*\* shall be filed no later than the end of the period in which it is permissible to file a motion pursuant to Section 2-1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” And that Section of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, “In all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment \*\*\*, file a motion \*\*\* for other relief.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a).”

The appellate court noted the above section of the Code of Civil Procedure. Then the appellate court stated:

However, 1964 amendments to the judicial article of the 1870 constitution radically changed the legislature’s role in determining the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Thus, the legislature’s *power to define the circuit court’s jurisdiction was expressly limited to the area of administrative review*. Id. The current constitution, adopted in 1970, retains this limitation.

But after discussing this, the appellate court stated:

Furthermore, Kristina has waived the issue of the failure of Dussias to comply with the time restrictions imposed by the legislature in section 508 by failing to object to Dussias’ fee petition and participating in court-ordered dispute mediation and a subsequent hearing

on the petition without an objection. *In re Marriage of Lindsey-Robinson*, 331 Ill. App. 3d 261, 265 (2002).

The *Lindsey-Robinson* was a case handled successfully by the *Gitlin & Gitlin* firm. Citing *Lindsey-Robinson*, the appellate court found there to be a waiver, “By proceeding without objection, the appellant waived any violation of the timing requirements of section 508(c) regarding the filing of the fee petition. *Lindsey-Robinson*, 331 Ill. App. 3d 261.”

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**Fees for Prosecuting Appeals: Substantially Prevailed for Fees for Appeals — Obtaining 50% of Relief Sought — *Murphy***: When discussing the 2002 *Murphy*, decision I had stated:

Another example of the poorly thought out nature of some of the amendments was the amendment to Section 508(a)(3.1) which provides that a party may obtain attorney's fees for the prosecution of an appeal if that party has “substantially prevailed.” [\*IRMO Murphy\*](#), 327 Ill.App.3d 845 (4th Dist. 2002), addressed the issue of what was meant by the term “substantially.” It ruled that for fees to be awarded under §508(a)(3.1), the party prosecuting appeal must obtain at least 50% of the relief sought.: The opinion states that to substantially prevail means to prevail “largely but not wholly,” taken from one dictionary definition. The analysis in *Murphy* measures relief sought versus relief obtained. It states that determination was not based on the fact that appellant prevailed on only one of four contentions raised but next commented that substantially prevails “suggests” one must obtain at least 50% of relief sought. It relied on federal law regarding the term “prevailed” as to fee awards in which only a partial victory was required. *Murphy* states that the term “substantially” must have been intended to prevent the application of the lower threshold.

Justice Cook dissented and properly suggested that the goal of Leveling Statute was to resolve conflict in case law as to whether fees could be awarded for successful appeal. Cook stated that it is not sufficient that a party prevails nominally or technically. There must be a victory in substance — a real victory. The dissent quotes the primary definition of “real” from *Websters* as “not imaginary or illusory, real, true,” and stated that the requirement of an overwhelming victory runs counter to the 1997 amendments:

If a party has a legitimate basis for appeal we should not attempt to discourage that party from raising other issues as well, even though the party thereby risks obtaining less than 50% of the relief sought. The appellate court should attempt to provide guidance on troublesome issues, not penalize parties for raising issues other than sure winners.

Note that the Illinois Supreme Court has accepted cert. I expect a reversal from the Illinois Supreme Court.

In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court did reverse the decision of the appellate court. In *IRMO Murphy*, (2003), the Court required fees to be awarded for appellate proceedings on a “claim-by-claim” basis, that is, if on an individual claim the petitioner substantially prevailed on the merits. The *Murphy* Supreme Court ruled, “ We believe that the appropriate reading of this section is that, in the context of a petition for fees for prosecution of an appeal, the circuit court may only award fees incurred for those individual claims on which the appellant can be said to have “substantially prevailed” on appeal.” The *Murphy* Supreme Court stated:

Our construction of the statute obviates this concern. An appellant may petition for fees incurred in the prosecution of any issue on which he substantially prevailed on a prior appeal, regardless of how many other issues may have been raised. However, awarding appellate fees on a claim-by-claim basis also removes any affirmative incentive for a party to add frivolous issues on appeal along with meritorious issues, in hopes of increasing the fees which his opponent may be required to pay. By our construction of the statute a party may raise any claims he desires on appeal. While the circuit court may award fees for issues deemed meritorious by the appellate court, no recompense will be had for preparation of claims on which the appellate court determined not to grant relief.

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**Failure to Comply with Court Orders — Compelling Cause or Justification Standard / Burden of Proof is on Non-Complying Party:** 508(b) of the IMDMA states:

In every proceeding for the enforcement of an order or judgment when the court finds that the **failure** to comply with the order or judgment was **without compelling** cause or justification, the court shall order the party against whom the proceeding is brought to pay the costs and reasonable attorney's fees of the prevailing party.

This was one more place in the statutory scheme that the 2016 amendments were well intentioned did not any lend enough clarity. The key legal issue in addressing fees per §508(b) is the burden of proof issue, i.e., is the burden of proof the same as in contempt proceedings. If the burden of proof is the same as in contempt proceedings, then once a party would show non-compliance then the burden would shift. The “Leveling” amendment added the word “compelling” to the cause or justification language of §508(b). However, the amendments did not eliminate the double negative contained in this section. The first negative is the failure to comply. The second negative is the “without compelling cause or justification” standard. The statute states that once the court makes a finding that there is no compelling cause or justification, then fees are mandatory. This begs the question, however. The potential legal issue is who has the burden of showing whether there is a cause or justification for non-compliance once non-compliance is demonstrated.

[\*McGuire\*](#), 305 Ill.App.3d 474 (5th Dist. 1999) (discussed above), stated:

Generally, courts have broad discretion in determining whether to grant attorney fees in dissolution proceedings. However, when a party's failure to comply with an order is

without cause or justification, an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs is mandatory. See *In re Marriage of Baggett*, 281 Ill. App. 3d 34 (1996) [Discussed below]. It is within the court's discretion to decide whether the delinquent spouse's failure to pay maintenance was "without cause or justification". (Citations Omitted.)

The issue not clarified by the above is who has the burden of proof per §508(b) once a party is shown not to have complied with a court order. There are several cases all holding that the burden of proof is on the party who does not comply with a court order. *McGuire*, 305 Ill.App.3d 474 (5th Dist. 1999), was one of the few Illinois post-Leveling appellate court decision addressing this issue.

*McGuire* further stated:

Under section 508(b), **if a party to a dissolution does not fulfill a condition imposed upon him or her by an order, the burden is on that party to produce evidence of cause or justification.** See *In re Marriage of Baggett*, 281 Ill. App. 3d 34 (1996); 750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West 1994). **According to section 508(b), as amended, the noncompliant party is required to demonstrate compelling cause or justification.** 750 ILCS 508(b) (West 1996).

The opinion noted that in that case the husband offered evidence as to his cause or justification for his non-compliance and did not reverse the trial court's discretion in ruling that the husband had met his burden of proof.

Similarly, *Baggett* (cited by *McGuire*) stated:

When an order has not been complied with, the court need not find the respondent in contempt, but it should then determine whether any failure to pay was "without cause or justification" for purposes of mandatory attorney fees under section 508 of the Act. *In re Marriage of Roach*, 245 Ill.App.3d 742, 748 (1993).

*Baggett* pointed out that in contempt proceedings a *prima facie* case of contempt is established merely by establishing the non-compliance. The burden of establishing a defense of course shifts to the alleged contemnor. The *Baggett* court applies the same evidentiary rule to the "without cause or justification" issue in an application for attorney's fees for enforcement. *Baggett* stated:

In this case, the record is devoid of any evidence of [the ex-husband's] cause or justification for not complying with the order. Therefore, we hold that the court erred in not granting Rebecca attorney fees, and we remand for the court to determine a fair and reasonable amount of attorney fees.

Another case consistent with *Baggett* and *Roach* is *IRMO Young*, 200 Ill.App.3d 226 (4th Dist. 1990). Based upon this line of cases, it appears clear that the word "compelling" was likely added to the statute to indicate that once non-compliance is shown, the burden of proof to avoid payment of attorney's fees is that the non-complying party must show his or her **compelling** cause or justification for non-

compliance. At least in this regard the amendment to §508(b) did not have the opposite intended effect. It probably does lend some additional clarity to this aspect of the fee statute.

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**Abuse of Allocated Parenting Time and 750 ILCS 5/607.5 Effective January 1, 2016:**

There are new fee provisions within the abuse of parenting time provisions of Section 607.5.

(d) In addition to any other order entered under subsection (c), except for good cause shown, the court shall order a parent who has failed to provide allocated parenting time or to exercise allocated parenting time to pay the aggrieved party his or her reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and expenses associated with an action brought under this Section. If the court finds that the respondent in an action brought under this Section has not violated the allocated parenting time, the court may order the petitioner to pay the respondent's reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and expenses incurred in the action.

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**Fee Provisions in 2016 Relocation Statute:**

The new provisions in the child relocation statute provide:

The court may consider a parent's failure to comply with the notice requirements of this Section without good cause (i) as a factor in determining whether the parent's relocation is in good faith; and (ii) as a basis for awarding reasonable attorney's fees and costs resulting from the parent's failure to comply with these provisions.

**Fee Provisions in Modification of Parenting Time / Parental Responsibility Amendments, Effective January 1, 2016:** There are similar but somewhat different provisions to the fee provisions for vexatious “custody” modification litigation. See: 750 ILCS 5/610.5. Subsection (f) now provides:

Attorney's fees and costs shall be assessed against a party seeking modification if the court finds that the modification action is vexatious or constitutes harassment. If the court finds that a parent has repeatedly filed frivolous motions for modification, the court may bar the parent from filing a motion for modification for a period of time.

The later language is entirely new.

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**Attorney's Fees and Reasonableness of Party / Court's Consideration of Conduct that Needlessly Increases the Cost of the Litigation vs. Right to Present Good Faith Case:**

One of the relatively "early" post-"Leveling" cases that related to attorney's fees because of a party's "unreasonable" conduct. In *IRMO Menken*, 334 Ill.App.3d 531 (2nd Dist. 2002), at issue was the husband's failure to consent to the issuance of a QILDRO affecting his state retirement benefits (Rockford police benefits.) The trial court entered an order that the father would not be required to pay fees unless he refused to consent to the issuance of a QILDRO. Later, when the husband in fact refused to consent, the trial court entered an order for fees. The appellate court gratuitously commented (because the father did not appeal the issue) that, "we feel compelled to note that the trial court should not have conditioned the amount of attorney fees on whether respondent signed the consent form. The issues were unrelated..."

*IRMO Haken* (Fourth Dist. 2009), addressed the language of §508(b) that had then read:

If at any time a court finds that a hearing under **this [s]ection** was precipitated or conducted for any improper purpose, the court shall allocate fees and costs of all parties for the hearing to the party or counsel found to have acted improperly.

The issue was the "under this section" limitation in §508(b). The appellate court stated:

Rudolf argues this subsection does not apply to this case because (1) this was not an action to enforce an order or judgment, and (2) no hearing was conducted under this section that was precipitated by some improper purpose. Rudolf claims the plain language of the above-quoted section requires, at least, one of these two occurrences. We conclude Rudolf's interpretation of the circumstances of when this section applies may be too limited. However, we need not determine whether section 508(b) is applicable because Leila argued for and the trial court awarded fees under section 508(a).

However, there is other useful language regarding unnecessarily increasing the cost of litigation in this decision:

We believe the language in section 503 allows a court to consider an "unnecessary increase in the cost of litigation" when determining a fee award under section 508(a). Section 503(d) provides "[the court] also shall divide the marital property \*\*\* in just proportions considering all relevant factors." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2008). Unnecessarily increasing the cost of litigation is a relevant factor in the division of property as well as in allocating attorney fees.

*Haken* is a good precursor to understanding the importance of the amendments to the Leveling the Playing Field statute under PA 96-583. Perhaps the largest change to the Leveling the Playing Field statute in the 2009 Amendments changes only one word in §508(b):

If at any time a court finds that a hearing under this Act Section was precipitated or conducted for any improper purpose, the court shall allocate fees and costs of all parties for the hearing to the party or counsel found to have acted improperly. Improper purposes

include, but are not limited to, harassment, unnecessary delay, or other acts needlessly increasing the cost of litigation.

Another case also addressing the court's consideration of the conduct of a party in increasing the cost of litigation is *IRMO Harrison*, 388 Ill. App. 3d 115 (First, Dist., 2009). Rarely has an Illinois case addressed the language in §610(c) regarding vexatious custody litigation (fee awards where a custody modification proceeding is vexatious and constitutes harassment). While the trial court found a pattern of alienating behavior, the appellate court found that there was no reversible error where the father had been successful in two previous modifications of custody proceedings to obtain custody of the two other children. Additionally, the court appointed expert had recommended in favor of the ex-husband.

But compare this to a recent case involving an unsuccessful petition regarding a maintenance review hearing. In *IRMO Bolte*, 2012 IL App (3d) 110791 (September 12, 2012), the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision regarding attorney's fees based upon the trial court's flawed analysis of work that was reasonable and necessary. The trial court based its fee decision, in part, on its determination that the wife was barred from seeking permanent maintenance because of the title placed on maintenance as being "rehabilitative." The appellate court stated:

Furthermore, the research and discovery conducted by counsel in regard to Terry's financial status at the time of the September 1 hearing was relevant to a meaningful review of both the maintenance and attorney fees issues. To find otherwise disregards the statutory directives of both sections 510(a-5) and 504(a). \*\*\* Section 503(j)(2) provides that any award of contribution for fees and costs to one party from the other party shall be based on the criteria for division of marital property under this section 503 and, if maintenance has been awarded, on the criteria for an award of maintenance under section 504 (750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) (West 2010)).

The appellate court then reviewed the parties' very different financial circumstances including the former husband's pensions and pension payments, his current wife's income from employment and the limited cash flow of the former wife. The appellate court then concluded:

The trial court acknowledged the obvious great disparity between Sue's and Terry's actual earnings and their earning capacities. Sue depends solely on social security disability benefits and maintenance payments, and her earning capacity is virtually eliminated due to her disability. A thorough review of the record makes clear that Sue has proven she lacks the ability to pay, and conversely, Terry is more than able. Sue is not required to show destitution in order for the trial court to award her attorney fees. *See Gable*, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 700. The trial court, nonetheless, ordered Terry to pay only half of Sue's fees, predominately on the basis that her claim for increased maintenance was "nonmeritorious." To the contrary, it was imperative for Sue's counsel to pursue information regarding Terry's finances in order to have both a meaningful review of the maintenance award and the petition for attorney fees. The trial court abused its discretion in ruling on Sue's request for attorney fees.

(5) FEES. The counsel's fee for services may not be contingent upon the securing of a dissolution of marriage or upon being allocated parental responsibility...

Accordingly, you need to delete the phrase "obtaining custody."

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