Illinois rewrote our paternity law effective January 1, 2016. Here the Gitlin Law firm provides the text of the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 with its technical corrections highlighted.
We include the amendments through to May 24, 2024.
Presumption of Parentage
The Illinois Parentage Act establishes the definition of what makes someone a parent under Illinois law. There are different circumstances that create a presumption of parentage. Understand that the Act presumes that an individual is legally a child’s parent if he or she meets any of the following:
- The child was born while the individual was married to or in a civil union with the child’s mother;
- The child was born within 300 days of the individual’s divorce or dissolution of the civil union with the child’s mother;
- The individual married or entered a civil union with the child’s mother after the child was born and put his or her name on the child’s birth certificate; or
- The child was born within 300 days of an annulment of an invalid marriage or civil union between the mother and the other individual.
Key decisions to consider including In re Parentage of Miller v. Guy. This case involves world-famous musician and blues artist Buddy Guy. The appellate court had allowed oral argument regarding the limited issue of whether there had been a moment in time when the law permitted Miller to file a paternity action prior to the passage of the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015. It also addressed the relevance of a specific case to Buddy Guys claimed property interest in need of protection. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s dismissal because appellant didn’t have an express and definite right to sue under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 that was then extinguished by the Act’s statute of limitations. As a result, respondent, gained no vested right or interest, and there was no need to determine whether the alleged right was protected by the due process clause.
See In re Parentage of J.W. involving petitions for fees. It held: [1]-The court erroneously determined that without a written agreement between the mother and her attorney, 750 ILCS 5/508 (2014) precluded contribution to attorney fees and costs because the mother was seeking fees from the opposing party and 750 ILCS 5/508(c) was inapplicable; the court should have held an evidentiary hearing, despite the lack of a written agreement pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/508(c).
